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Technology and demand mechanism in firm 
diversification strategies. An experimental 
method to discriminate the fundamental drivers1 
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ABSTRACT: An essential part of any firm’s corporate strategy is the choice of the business portfolio 
through which to compete. When the portfolio’s decision involves more than one business, firms are said 
to implement a diversification strategy, which is put into action through the firms concomitant entry in 
different market segments. It implies that the nature of the market segmentation affects the firms’ 
differentiation degree. The aim of this paper consists in exploring a method for determining the market 
segmentation that is most informative to understand firms’ diversification strategies, or in other words the 
market segmentation that most clearly reveals about firms’ main diversification drivers. Given that each 
business can be described according to a set of business characteristics and by using different levels of 
detail, in the perspective of understanding firm diversification strategies, it is fundamental to determine 
the directions in the space of business characteristics along which it is “mostly convenient” to claim the 
business diversity and which is the “best” level of aggregation at which assess the businesses boundaries. 
This paper proposes an experimental method to do it. In particular, it empirically discerns which of two 
particular criteria – functional versus technological – mostly enrich our understanding of the 
diversification strategies adopted by Italian plastic processing machinery suppliers, finding out the most 
instructive level of aggregation of the market segmentation – namely the best segment dimension – to 
investigate the firms diversification strategies. 
KEYWORDS: firm diversification, technology, market segmentation, simulation process. 
JEL CODES: L1, L6 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
ny firm’s portfolio decision that 
involves a diversification strategy 
implies that firms enter in 
different product market segments
2
. As a 
result one of the most discerning measure of 
firms’ degree of diversification is the number 
of different market segments simultaneously 
“occupied” by the firms. It implies that the 
nature of the market segmentation affects the 
firms’ differentiation degree. In fact, as the 
dimension of segments grows, the firms’ 
degree of diversification decreases; whereas 
the broader the overlap between the set of 
characteristics driving the market 
segmentation and the set of factors driving the 
firms’ differentiation strategies, the higher the 
firms’ degree of differentiation. 
This paper aims at exploring a method for 
determining the market segmentation that is 
most revealing about firms’ diversification 
strategies, which correspond to the market 
segmentation that is most instructive about 
firms’ main diversification criteria.  
The nature of the method is comparative, in 
particular it compares various market 
segmentations - which differ in terms of 
segmentation’s criteria and levels of 
aggregation - with the purpose of determining 
the most convenient for exploring firms’ 
diversification strategies. To give an example 
of possible applications, consider the case of 
                                                     
2 In this stage of the paper, the notion of market 
segment is left voluntarily vague, without any 
distinction between the more precise concepts of 
product market segment or geographic market 
segment - pertaining to the industrial organization 
literature - or the generic concept of market 
segment - pertaining the marketing area. Later, in 
the paper, this notions will be further specified. 
two “products” that are devoted to the same 
use and that embed different technologies; and 
that, because of these attributes, are doubted 
to correspond to either one or different items 
in a business portfolio. A firm that offers two 
“products” which are devoted to the same use 
and which embed different technologies 
would occupy one market segment according 
to a “functional market segmentation” and 
different market segments according to a 
“technological market segmentation”. 
Therefore, according to a “functional 
criterion” the firm appears not diversified, 
while it appears diversified according to a 
“technological criterion”. In this case I aim at 
discerning which of the two criteria – 
functional versus technological - is more 
reliable to study firms’ diversification 
strategies; or in other words, which of the two 
criteria do incorporate more clearly the 
strategic considerations underlying the 
diversification process. In addition, we aim at 
find out the most instructive level of 
aggregation of the market segmentation – 
namely the best segment dimension – to 
investigate the firms diversification strategies; 
to do this, I necessarily need to consider 
hierarchical market segmentations.  
This comparative methodology will be 
empirically applied to the case of the Italian 
plastic processing machinery industry, whose 
firms’ products portfolios are known at an 
extremely disaggregate level of detail and 
grouped according to different hierarchical 
classifications [data source: 
ASSOCOMAPLAST] (see section 2). 
The reminder of the paper is organised into 
3 sections. Section 1 focuses on theoretical 
background. Section 2 describes the method 
and the data used in the analysis.  
A 
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Section 3 focuses on the empirical 
application of the method and on the 
explanation of the results.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The concept of diversification does not lend 
itself to an easy conceptualisation; in fact 
there is still a lack of consensus as to its 
precise meaning. Early contributions defined 
“diversification” in terms of “heterogeneity of 
output” (Gort, 1962), where two outputs were 
considered to be different if they were serving 
separated markets, that was to say if their 
cross-elasticities of demand were low. Or, 
again, diversification was described as “an 
increase in the number of industries in which 
the firms compete” (Berry ,1975), where 
industry boundaries were assumed to be 
given. Later on (Pitts and Hopkins (1982), and 
Teece (1982)) the concept of “industry” was 
substituted with the concept of “business”, 
thus introducing a greater subjectivity in the 
definition of the diversification strategies. 
Along time, numerous authors have been 
questioned themselves on the subject of the 
assessment of the business boundaries and 
business diversity, and on the more complex 
issue of the extent to which this business 
diversity should lead to the definition of 
different businesses in terms of diversification 
strategy (for a review see Ramadujam V. and 
Varadarajan P. (1989)).  
Theoretical and empirical solutions to 
identify diversification processes are often 
irreconcilable, given that theoretically lucid 
solutions are often hardly employable from an 
empirical point of view. Consider, for 
instance, Gort (1962) statement about two 
products being serving separated markets, 
conditioned to their cross-elasticities of 
demand being low. Consider, furthermore, 
that others authors add to the previous 
statement that two products serve separated 
markets if, in the short run, the necessary 
resources employed in the production and 
distribution of one cannot be shifted to the 
other. Evidently, such criteria hide lots of 
operational difficulties in their empirical 
application; therefore, along time, many 
academics have considered several, variously 
objective and accurate, proxies of the 
theoretical definitions of “separated markets”. 
They are essentially classifiable in two main 
classes of proxies: one based on “exogenous” 
market classifications (as the SIC hierarchical 
classification); the other based on “ad hoc” 
classifications, built up by interviewing 
managers and by analysing firms specific 
data. 
The first class of proxies pertains to the 
traditional Industrial Organization approach. 
In spite of their reliability and objectivity, 
these proxies hide a category of potential 
limitations which essentially ground their 
roots in the way these classifications are built. 
According to “Machinery and Allied Products 
Institute” (1974), the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) system was developed by 
the federal government as a way of classifying 
all types of business activity in the economy. 
To do this it employs a set of reporting 
standards that have evolved over time based 
on a variety of considerations ranging from 
similarities in materials to product-market 
linkages; consequently the SIC predetermined 
product markets segmentations appear to be 
mainly based on the sharing of resources in 
production and raw material rather than, for 
instance, in marketing or R&D. For this 
reason, several studious have critiqued the use 
of SIC codes in assessing the diversity of 
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businesses, because SIC codes inevitably – 
because of the way it is constructed - overlook 
some (potentially fundamental) strategic 
dimensions. 
The second class of proxies was originally 
introduced by Wrigley (1970) and 
subsequently refined by Rumelt (1974). 
Rumelt (1974) proposed a method to discern 
between different (and separated) markets on 
the bases of their strategic independence, 
where two market were considered 
strategically independent if we could 
implement change on one of them without 
influencing the other. Instead of a single index 
of diversity, Rumelt (1974, 1982) employed a 
combination of objective and subjective 
criteria to classify relatedness, even based on 
questions directed to managers of firms, about 
the perceived diversity among products 
belonging to their firms merchandise 
portfolios. Even if this measurement method 
is not easily replicable and cumulative, the 
Wrigley and Rumelt studies are viewed, in 
Strategic Management literature, as an 
important conceptual advance over the 
exploitation of rigorous and a priori 
segmentations of the market, because of its 
capacity to flexibly capture strategic 
interdependences between markets. 
 
Firms’ diversification determinants 
A review of the economic literature on the 
topic of firm diversification strategies (e.g. 
Penrose (1959), Panzar and Willig (1975), 
Teece (1982), Markides C. and Williamson 
P.J. (1996), Bottazzi G. and Secchi A. (2005)) 
reveals that traditionally researchers tended to 
justify the existence of multi-product firms by 
reasons of risk diversification and exploitation 
of static or dynamic economies of scope and 
scale (diversification determinants). In 
exploring such economic literature it is 
advantageous to make a preliminary 
discrimination between two major types of 
diversification strategies: related 
diversification versus unrelated 
diversification. According to Casson (2000), 
Penrose (1959/1995) and Wernerfelt (1984), 
all the viable diversification strategies 
involving physical linkages (in terms of 
products and geographical market) and 
knowledge linkages between businesses are 
classifiable as “related diversifications”. On 
the other hand, firms are considered to be 
involved in “un-related diversifications” 
when they are diversified in areas where no 
physical or knowledge resources are shared 
other than financial. The same discrimination 
has been explained by Dundas and Richardson 
(1980) by means of the specific types of 
market failures that give rise to specific 
classes of diversified firms: imperfections in 
the product and technological markets lead to 
related-diversified firms, while capital market 
failure give rise to unrelated-diversified firms.  
In spite of the abundance of economic 
literature on the topic of the diversification 
determinants, I report the contribution that 
Bailey and Friedlander (1982) gave to this 
subject by explaining, in a quite detailed way, 
several reasons that base the reduction in costs 
due to joint production of related output. They 
contemplate the following several cases: 
“separate products that naturally arise from a 
shared input, the presence of a fixed factor of 
production that is not fully utilised in 
production of a single product, economies of 
networking from joint production of 
networked products (e.g airlines), reuse of an 
input in more than one product (e.g. journal 
article abstracts reused in multiple indexes of 
articles), sharing of intangible assets between 
                                                         Santanera E., Working Paper Cnr-Ceris, N° 17/2013 
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products (e.g., R&D that supports multiple 
products)”. Each one of these points 
corresponds to a particular case of synergy 
exploitation from the “supply” point of view. 
Other authors studied synergies exploitations 
from both the demand and supply 
perspectives. For example, Abell (1980) – 
defining a business in terms of the following 
three elements: the customer function it seeks 
to satisfy, the customer groups it targets, and 
the technologies it uses in satisfying the 
customer functions sought by the targeted 
customer groups – highlights two kinds of 
synergies exploitations (on the demand side, 
in the first two cases; on the supply side in the 
third one). Again, supply and demand 
perspectives converge in Sutton’s theory 
about diversification, in fact - according to the 
author (Sutton, 1998) - technological features, 
pertaining to the supply side, and consumers’ 
preference distribution, pertaining to demand 
side, converge to constitute what Sutton calls 
the ‘relevant industry pattern of technology 
and taste’. This pattern relates to the extend to 
which a firm that spends heavily in carrying 
out R&D on one submarket will be able to 
capture sales at the expense of low-spending 
rivals operating along other submarkets. This 
in turn will depend on the strength of the 
linkage between different submarkets, both on 
the demand side (and so in terms of 
substitution) and on the supply side (and so in 
terms of scope economies in R&D, or 
spillovers). 
Each business can be described according to 
a set of business characteristics, and by using 
different levels of detail. This paper aims at 
determining the directions in the space of 
business characteristics along which it is 
“mostly convenient” to claim the business 
diversity and, and which is the “best” level of 
aggregation at which assess the businesses 
boundaries. As you have seen, different 
authors have answer to these questions by 
reminding conceptual theories about 
diversification. In this paper I propose a 
method to solve these questions from an 
empirical point of view.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
I intend to recognize the specific rationale 
that drives firm diversification strategies by 
exploiting the relationship between market 
segmentation and firms diversification. This is 
done by evaluating how the firms’ 
“positioning” among market segments 
changes together with different product 
market segmentations, in relation to the 
latter’s levels or criteria of aggregation.  
A firm, characterised by a fixed 
merchandise portfolio, will exhibit different 
degrees of diversification in correspondence 
of different segmentations of the same product 
market. In particular the degree of 
diversification will be higher where both 1) 
the market segmentations will exhibit lower 
level of aggregations and 2) the overlap 
between the set of characteristics driving the 
segmentation and the set of factors driving the 
firm diversification strategy will be broader.  
I assume that diversification strategies are 
mainly driven by the general, common, 
strategic rational of exploiting interrelations 
between products, either from the demand or 
the supply point of view, in order to achieve 
some cost and/or competitive advantages over 
rivals. This would imply that two 
“interrelated” market segments will exhibit a 
higher probability to be simultaneously 
captured by a firm than two “untied” ones. 
These interrelations cannot be defined but 
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with reference to the direction in the product 
space along which such link is measured: e.g. 
two products can exhibit a strong link on the 
bases of their functionality and a weak link on 
the bases of their design attributes. In this 
case, in correspondence to product market 
segmentations based on functional attributes, 
the two products will belong to strongly 
interrelated market segments; while in 
correspondence to product market 
segmentations based on design attributes, the 
two products will belong to weakly 
interrelated market segments. Given that there 
exist as much potential links between 
segments as the number of different directions 
in the space of product market characteristics, 
I empirically compare different product 
market attributes, at different levels of 
aggregation, in order to estimate which one 
enables firms to realize the maximum value of 
synergy exploitation. 
By varying - in terms of level and criteria of 
aggregation - the market segmentation, the 
firms positioning among the segments will 
vary. Consider, for example, a hierarchical 
product market segmentation composed by 
three levels of aggregations: k-1, k, k+1. 
Suppose that, at the (k-1)
th
 aggregation level, 
all the segments are completely unrelated, 
with any opportunity of synergy exploitation, 
neither from the demand nor from the supply 
point of view: they are, in other words, 
“independent”. Suppose that, in contrast, at 
the (k)
th
 level of aggregation some segments 
are interrelated, so that a firm that occupies 
simultaneously these segments can exploit 
some sort of synergies, so achieving a certain 
economic advantage. This would implies that, 
at the k
th
 aggregation level, the probability 
that a firm simultaneously occupies (a certain 
number of) interrelated segments is higher 
than the probability that it simultaneously 
occupies (the same number) of random 
segments. From a probabilistic point of view 
this means that the interrelated segments are 
not independent, and hence the probability 
that they are simultaneously occupied by a 
firm would not be given by the simple product 
of the probability associated to the occupation 
of each single segment, but it would be 
higher. At last, suppose that, at the (k+1)
 th
 
level, the highest probabilities of simultaneous 
segments “occupation” lie in correspondence 
of the aggregation of those segments that have 
exhibited synergies at the k
 th
 level of 
aggregation.  
Different linkages between segments induce 
different firms “positioning” among segments; 
in particular, the stronger the linkages 
between segments, the higher the probability 
that those segments are simultaneously 
occupied by the firms. Assuming that, at the 
lowest level of aggregation, k-1, the market is 
segmented in Nk-1 segments, it follows that 
each firm can simultaneously capture a 
number of segments (nk-1) which is comprised 
between 0 and Nk-1. In that case I would say 
that each firm can “play a number of roles  
(nk-1) comprised between 0 and Nk-1”.  
Given that by varying the level of 
aggregation, it varies the number of segments 
in which the market is split up, hence 
presumably Nk-1 differs from Nk and from 
Nk+1. The function that associates to each nk-1 
the number of firms that simultaneously 
occupy that number (nk-1)of segments is f(nk-
1), which represents the distribution of the 
number of roles played by the firms in 
correspondence of the (k-1)
th
 aggregation 
level of the hierarchical market segmentation. 
Similarly, in correspondence of the k
th
 and 
(k+1)
th
 level of aggregation, we can 
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empirically observe the f(nk) and f(nk+1) 
distribution of the number of firm roles. 
Hence, summing up, the nature of the 
segments linkages in correspondence of 
different levels of aggregation [k-1, k and 
k+1] forebodes different firms role 
distributions [f(nk-1), f(nk), f(nk+1)] in 
correspondence of the different levels of 
aggregation. By examining how the firm 
positioning among segments changes together 
with the market segmentations, we can 
empirically identify the market segmentation 
that exhibits the maximum evidence of firms 
synergy exploitation. This is done by 
comparing the empirical distributions of the 
roles that the firms play in correspondence of 
different market segmentations, with their 
theoretical counterparts. The firm roles 
theoretical distribution is the distribution that 
would emerge if there were no 
interdependence between segments, thus if the 
simultaneous capture of segments were 
governed by a wholly random mechanism. In 
details, it is operationally built by replicating 
– in correspondence of the lowest level of 
aggregation - the empirical distribution of the 
roles played by the firms (in order to 
guarantee the correspondence between the 
empirical and the theoretical distributions), 
and by randomly allocating the identity of the 
segments simultaneously captured by the 
firms. Therefore, in correspondence of the 
lowest aggregation level ofthe theoretical 
firms roles distribution, I exclusively 
reproduce the empirically observed number of 
segments simultaneously occupied by each 
firm, but not the identity of the segments 
simultaneously captured, which is instead 
randomly allocated. At higher aggregation 
levels [in our example, k and k+1] the 
theoretical firms role distributions are 
obtained by grouping backward, according to 
the hierarchical branching paths, the segments 
simultaneously captured at the right lower 
levels of aggregation. It is presumable that 
the, so built, theoretical distributions of the 
number of firms roles will be dissimilar (in 
particular less concentrated) from their 
empirical counterparts, in correspondence of 
levels of aggregation higher than the lowest
3
. 
In fact, the closer the drivers of the market 
segmentation to the factors enabling the 
synergies exploitation [proper of the empirical 
case and not of the theoretical one], the higher 
the probability that firms role distributions 
will be concentrated. Hence, the occurrence of 
an empirical firms role distribution 
significantly more concentrated than its 
theoretical counterpart would testify the 
evidence of some sort of firms synergies 
exploitations. In that case, the probability that 
a cluster of segments are simultaneously 
“occupied” by a firm would not be randomly 
and homogeneously spread across segments, 
but would be instead concentrated on those 
segments that are “tied” on the basis of a 
specific criterion and that, therefore, if 
simultaneously captured, would consent the 
exploitation of some sort of synergies. That is 
why the market segmentation most revealing 
about firms’ diversification strategies is the 
one that gives rise to the most concentrated 
firms role distribution, conditionally it is 
significantly different from its theoretical 
counterpart.  
                                                     
3
 Because of the building structure of this 
methodology, I exclude any difference between the 
empirical and the theoretical firms roles 
distributions at the lowest level of aggregation; 
hence I assume, in some way, the lowest level of 
aggregation being redundant. 
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4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
An empirical application of this 
methodology has been carried out on the 
Italian plastic processing machinery industry, 
whose firms’ product portfolios are known at 
a deep level of detail, thanks to the 
exploitation of the ASSOCOMAPLAST 
database. ASSOCOMAPLAST is the Italian 
Plastic and Rubber Processing Machinery and 
Moulds Manufacturers’ Association, which 
includes 169 firms, that account for about 
60% of the total asset (sales) of the Italian 
industry, and that are depicted through their 
distinct merchandise portfolios.  
The merge of all the 169 firms merchandise 
portfolios constitutes the whole 
ASSOCOMAPLAST products list, which is 
composed by 363 different products. They 
consist of different types of machines to 
process plastic and rubber, e.g. granulators, 
presses, extruders, welders, cutting and 
splitting machines, handling technologies, 
robotics, control and automatic control 
technology, etc.. 
The aim of this empirical investigation 
consists in finding out the segmentation of the 
plastic processing machinery market that most 
clearly reveals about the firms’ main drivers 
of diversification (e.g. main sources of 
synergy exploitation from the supply and 
demand point of view). Because of the 
instrumental nature and technical features of 
the plastic processing machinery, plausible 
diversification “drivers” from the demand and 
supply point of view could be, respectively, 
the “functional driver” and the “technological 
driver”.  
In fact, the functional criterion is presumed 
to be one of the main purchasing rationale 
adopted by plastic and rubber processing 
machinery users; while the common 
technological know-how is supposed to be 
one of the strongest linkage between products 
from the supply point of view. Thus, as a 
starting point of the empirical analysis, I 
consider two different segmentations of the 
market of plastic and rubber processing 
machinery: one based on the products 
functionality, and one on the product 
technology. Subsequently, I analyse how 
firms position themselves among these two 
segmentations and how their diversification 
degrees vary in correspondence of the two 
different segmentations of the market.  
The first segmentation splits up the product 
market in “functional segments”, defined as 
clusters of products devoted to a similar use; 
the second splits it up in “technological 
segments”, defined as clusters of products 
which exhibit similar technological 
characteristics. 
 
Table 1. Functional segmentation [number of functional segments that compose  
the product market, at every level of aggregation]. 
 
Level i Nfi 
1 2 
2 10 
3 13 
4 27 
5 34 
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Table 2. Technological segmentation [number of technological segments that compose  
the product market, at every level of aggregation]. 
 
Level i Nti 
1 5 
2 25 
3 96 
4 183 
5 274 
6 302 
7 336 
8 348 
 
The functional classification, realised by 
tacking advantage of a technician consultancy, 
gives rise to a five-levels hierarchical 
segmentation
4
.  
                                                     
4
 The five levels of the functional classification 
remind the different stages of the consumer 
purchasing choice: from the preliminary, more 
macroscopic phases to the more detailed and 
microscopic ones. The first phase is relate to the 
choice of the material processable by the 
machinery, hence the first functional criterion 
permits to distinguish between plastic processing 
machineries and rubber processing machineries
4
. 
The second functional criterion reflects the role 
played by the machinery throughout the whole 
plastic or rubber product manufacturing process. 
Therefore plastic processing machineries will be 
distinguished from plastic post-processing 
machinery, from laboratory machineries, etc..  
The third functional criterion reveals the 
mechanical task each component is devoted to. It 
does not relate to the product processing cycle, but 
instead to the mechanical task each single 
component is, commonly, devoted to (e.g. tool, or 
equipment, or core machinery..). Finally, within 
each phase of the plastic or rubber production 
process, each mechanical instrument (tool or 
equipment or..) can be classified on the bases of 
the specific production variant it performs: this 
represents the forth criterion. The fifth criterion is 
simply a further specification of the forth.  
Whereas the technological classification, 
realised by separating the eight-digit 
ASSOCOMAPLAST code associated to each 
product, gives rise to an eight-levels 
hierarchical segmentation
5
. Both the 
segmentations are hierarchical and nested, and 
exhibit different levels of products 
aggregation in segments, and different 
structures of segments in correspondence of 
each level of aggregation, as we you can see 
in the Table 1 and Table2.  
                                                     
5
 ASSOCOMAPLAST’S web-site exhibits a 
product list, consisting in 363 items, which gathers 
all the ASSOCOMAPLAST members 
merchandise portfolios. Each item, in this list, is 
identified by a one to eight-digit code. Higher the 
number of digits, deeper the level of detail used in 
the description of the product. The level of detail 
used in the specification of each item does not 
necessarily concern to the technology intrinsic 
nature or to its advancement state of innovation; it 
could simply concern to the centrality of the 
product with regard to the industry product 
definition. That is, the more the product is close to 
the core business of the industry, the more it is 
expected to be detailing described in the 
classification. This classification, differently from 
the functional one, is “items driven”: the categories 
are not a priori stated, but are settled following the 
product configuration in the list.  
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Table 3 Automa s.p.a. merchandise portfolio 
 
As said before, different product market 
segmentations give rise to different firms 
“diversification patterns”, in terms of number 
of roles played by each firm.  
Consider, as example, the case of the firm 
Automa s.p.a., which is an 
ASSOCOMAPLAST member, and that -
according to the merchandise portfolio present 
on ASSOCOMAPLAST’s web site - offers 15 
items, as we can see in the following Table 3. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the 
eighth-digit codes which identify each of the 
15 items produced by Automa s.p.a. 
According to these codes, Automa occupies 
one single technological segment at the first 
level of aggregation (01; first digit of the 
code), at the second (01.02; first two digits of 
the code) and at the third level of aggregation 
(01.02.05; first three digits). At the forth level 
of aggregation Automa s.p.a. occupies three 
technological segments (01.02.05.01; 
01.02.05.03; 01.02.05.04); while from the 
fifth to the eighth levels of aggregation, it 
occupies 15 technological segments. 
According to the functional classification, 
Automa occupies one functional segment at 
the first level of aggregation (all the 15 items 
belong to the category of machinery that 
process plastic), one functional segment at the 
second level of aggregation (all the 15 items 
belong to the category of processing plants), 
one functional segment at the third level of 
aggregation (all the 15 items belong to the 
category of machinery), one functional 
segment at the forth level of aggregation (all 
the 15 items belong to the category of the 
blow moulding machines) and two functional 
segment at the fifth level of aggregation (8 
items belong to the category of the extrusion 
blow moulding machines; 7 items belong to 
the category of the injection blow moulding 
machines).  
Hence, Automa s.p.a. exhibits various roles, 
both    among    technological   segments   and  
01.02.05.01.00.00.00.00  extrusion blow moulding machines  
01.02.05.01.01.00.00.00  from 0 to 100 cu cm  
01.02.05.01.02.00.00.00  >100 cu cm to 1 l  
01.02.05.01.03.00.00.00  >1 I to 5 l  
01.02.05.01.04.00.00.00  >5 I to 10 l  
01.02.05.01.05.00.00.00  >10 I to 30 l  
01.02.05.01.06.00.00.00  >30 I to 120 l  
01.02.05.01.07.00.00.00  >120 l  
01.02.05.03.00.00.00.00  injection blow moulding machines  
01.02.05.03.01.00.00.00  from 0 to 100 cu cm  
01.02.05.03.02.00.00.00  >100 cu cm to 1 l  
01.02.05.04.00.00.00.00  injection stretch blow moulding machines  
01.02.05.04.01.00.00.00  from 0 to 100 cu cm  
01.02.05.04.02.00.00.00  >100 cu cm to 1 l  
01.02.05.04.03.00.00.00  >1 I  
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Figure 1. Firm role distributions in correspondence of, differently aggregated, technological 
market segmentations. 
 
functional segments, in correspondence of 
different specification levels. Which of the 
previous roles hypothetically played by 
Automa s.p.a. is the most proper to describe 
the Automa s.p.a. real diversification strategy? 
I have explored this sort of question at the 
industry level. 
The following Figure 1 shows the 
distributions of the number of roles that the 
169 Italian plastic and rubber processing 
machinery builders play in correspondence to 
each of the eight, differently aggregated, 
technological segmentations of the product 
market [where the product market consists in 
the whole ASSOCOMAPLAST product list, 
composed by 363 items].  
Likewise, Figure 2 shows the distributions 
of the number of roles played by the 169 firms 
in correspondence to each of the five 
differently aggregated functional 
segmentations of the product market. Being 
nti and nfi the number of, respectively, 
technological and functional segments 
occupable by a firm at the i
th
 level of 
specification; and being f(nti) and  f(nfi) the 
probability that a firm occupies nti 
technological segments and nfi functional 
segments, respectively; in the following 
graphics (Figure 1 and 2)  
I illustrate the distributions of the number of 
roles [f(nti) and f(nfi)] that the Italian plastic 
and rubber processing machinery builders 
play respectively among technological 
segments nti [Figure 1] and functional 
segments nfi [Figure 2] in correspondence of 
each level of aggregation i.  
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Figure 2. Firm role distributions in correspondence of, differently aggregated, functional 
segmentations. 
 
As you can infer from the graphics above, 
and as expected, by modifying the criteria and 
the aggregation levels of the product market 
segmentations , the distribution of the number 
of firms’ roles (measured by the number of 
segments simultaneously occupied by the 
firms) changes accordingly.  
Hence, I aim at identifying which one of the 
13 firms’ roles distributions (eight 
distributions in correspondence of the 
technological segmentations, and five 
distributions in correspondence of the 
functional ones) mostly enrich our 
understanding of the diversification strategies 
adopted by plastic processing machinery 
suppliers, and, consequently, which product 
market segmentation is most informative on  
 
the firms’ fundamental diversification criteria.  
I compare the empirical firm roles 
distributions with their theoretical 
counterparts, in correspondence of each of the 
13 market segmentations, by imposing the 
coincidence of the two classes of distributions 
at the lowest levels of aggregation (in order to 
guarantee the “correspondence” between 
theoretical and empirical firms role 
distributions). In the following Table 4 and 
Table 5 you can see the detail of the empirical 
firm role distributions in correspondence of 
the lowest levels of aggregation of, 
respectively, the technological and functional 
market segmentations [the same that are 
represented in Figure 1 (level 8), and Figure 2 
(level 5), respectively].  
 
 
 
 
 level 1
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1 2
ni
f(
ni
)
% imp
level 2
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
1 2 3 4 5 6
ni
f(
ni
)
% imp
level 3
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ni
f(
ni
)
%imp
level 4
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ni
f(
ni
)
% imp
level 5
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ni
f(
ni
) % imp
                                                         Santanera E., Working Paper Cnr-Ceris, N° 17/2013 
 16 
Table 4. Empirical firms roles distribution in correspondence of the lowest levels of 
aggregation in the technological market segmentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Empirical firms roles distribution in correspondence of the lowest levels of 
aggregation in the functional market segmentation 
 
n roles n firms 
1 50 
2 34 
3 26 
4 25 
5 15 
6 4 
7 6 
8 2 
9 3 
10 2 
11 2 
  
n roles n firms n roles n firms 
1 13 21 2 
2 10 22 3 
3 11 23 1 
4 12 24 1 
5 21 27 3 
6 7 28 1 
7 9 29 2 
8 5 30 3 
9 6 31 2 
10 5 32 1 
11 2 35 2 
12 10 37 1 
13 5 41 1 
14 2 42 1 
15 6 44 1 
16 3 50 1 
17 6 58 1 
18 4 69 1 
19 1 101 1 
20 2 
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According to Table 4 at the eighth 
aggregation level of the technologically 
segmented product market, 13 firms play one 
single role, 10 firms play two roles, and so on 
till the (single) firm that plays 101 roles 
(which means that one firm occupy 
simultaneously 101 technological segments). 
Similarly, according to Table 5, at the fifth 
aggregation level of the functionally 
segmented product market, 50 firms play one 
role, 34 firms play two roles, and so on till the 
2 firms that play 11 roles. 
While the theoretical distributions of the 
number of roles (played by the firms at the 
lowest levels of aggregation of the two market 
segmentations) do replicate the empirical 
“correspondent” distributions of the number 
of roles, they do not replicate the identity of 
the roles played by the firms. In other words, 
at the lowest levels of aggregation, what are 
exactly replicated are the distributions of the 
number of segments simultaneously captured 
by the firms in the two segmentations, but not 
the identity of the segments simultaneously 
occupied, which are instead randomly 
allocated among all the segments theoretically 
occupable. After that, at higher aggregation 
levels, the theoretical firm role distributions 
are obtained by grouping backward, according 
to the hierarchical branching paths, the 
segments simultaneously captured at the right 
lower levels of aggregation. 
I define a “simulation process” the 
following sequence of two operations: the first 
operation consists in randomly allocating the 
identity of the roles played by the firms at the 
lowest level of aggregation; while the second 
consists in aggregating the firms roles at 
levels of aggregation higher than the lowest 
by following backward the branching path of 
the two market segmentations. By repeating 
this “simulation process” a sufficient number 
of times (25000) so as to reach convergences 
values, I obtain the (simulated) theoretical 
firms’ roles distributions. In particular, each 
single “simulation process” converges to two 
sort of results: the first result consists in the 
number of roles played by the firms in 
correspondence of each aggregation level 
higher than the lowest, conditioned to the 
number of roles played at the lowest 
aggregation level; while the second result 
consists in the standard deviation which 
characterised the first class of results in 
comparison with their mean values (calculated 
on 25000 simulation processes). By weighing 
(multiplying) this two classes of convergence 
values - calculated in correspondence of each 
role that firms empirically play at the lowest 
level of the two market segmentation (see first 
columns of  Table 4 and Table 5) - with the 
firm role distribution empirically observable 
at the lowest level of aggregation (see second 
columns of Table 4 and Table 5) and then by 
cumulating these results in correspondence of 
each aggregation level of the two 
segmentations, I obtain two classes of results. 
The first consists in the expected values of the 
theoretical firm roles distribution, in 
correspondence of each aggregation level of 
the technological (see Table 6, in Appendix) 
and functional (see Table 7, in Appendix) 
segmentation. The second consists in the 
expected asymptotic standard deviations of 
the theoretical firm role distributions, in 
correspondence of each aggregation level of 
the technological (see Table 8, in Appendix) 
and functional (see Table 9, in Appendix) 
segmentation. 
By confronting the theoretical and empirical 
firms role distributions, I aim at evaluating 
the    possible   presence   of   any   significant  
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Figure3 Empirical and theoretical patterns of diversification in correspondence of 
technological segmentations. 
 
 
discrepancy between the two classes of 
distributions, in order to recognize both the 
segmentation criterion and the aggregation 
level which most clearly reveals about the 
firms main diversification drivers.  
In fact, the higher the discrepancy between 
the empirically observed distribution of the 
number of firms roles and its theoretical 
version, the stronger the evidence of some sort 
of synergies exploitation. 
I assume such discrepancy being significant 
whenever it is bigger than twice the 
asymptotic standard deviations of the 
theoretical firm role distributions (2), see 
Table 10 and Table 11 in Appendix. 
By observing the following Figure 3 e 
Figure 4, it is possible to state that - as 
expected - the empirical firm role distributions 
are more concentrate that the theoretical ones 
in correspondence of every aggregation level; 
even if they are significantly more 
concentrated almost exclusively in 
correspondence of the technological 
segmentations. 
Figure 3 shows the comparison between the 
expected values of the empirical (thin 
continuous line) and the theoretical firm role  
 
distributions (thick continuous line) in 
correspondence of the eight, differently 
aggregated, technological market 
segmentations.  
By comparing the E(rt)-2 σt (hatched line) 
with E(Rt) (thin continuous line) it emerges 
that, almost at every level of aggregation of 
the technological market segmentations, there 
exists some evidence of the significant 
discrepancy between theoretical and empirical 
firms roles distributions.  
It means that there is a strong empirical 
evidence of the exploitation of technological 
synergies by the Italian plastic and rubber 
processing machinery builders.  
In particular, given that the maximum 
discrepancy emerges in correspondence of the 
fifth aggregation level, it means that they 
exploit specific and deep technological 
synergies in their diversification choices. 
The following Figure 4 shows the 
comparison between the expected values of 
the empirical (thin continuous line) and the 
theoretical firm role distributions (thick 
continuous line) in correspondence of the five, 
differently aggregated, functional market 
segmentations.  
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Figure 4 Empirical and theoretical patterns of diversification in correspondence of functional 
segmentations. 
 
From the comparison between E(rf)-2 σf 
(hatched line) and E(Rf) (thin continuous line) 
it emerges that, at every aggregation level of 
the functional market segmentation a part 
from the first, it is not observable any 
significant discrepancy between the 
theoretical and empirical distributions of the 
number of firms roles. It means that there is 
not a strong evidence of the exploitation of 
functional synergies by the Italian plastic and 
rubber processing machinery builders. 
These results indicate that the 
diversification degree of the Italian plastic and 
rubber processing machinery builders is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
properly measurable by counting the number 
of segments that they occupy at the fifth 
aggregation level of the technological 
segmentation. Furthermore, these empirical 
evidences suggest that in this industry 
technological forces play a more fundamental 
role than functional ones in the choice of 
diversification.  
This corroborates with strong, if localised, 
empirical evidence the findings of those 
branches of the economic literature that have 
emphasized the importance of technological 
factors in the domain of business portfolio 
decisions. 
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APPENDIX 
Theoretical firms’ roles distributions 
 
 
Table 1. Expected values [E(rt,i)] of the theoretical firms’ roles distributions, in correspondence 
of, differently aggregated, technological market segmentations. [I= level of aggregation]. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Expected values [E(rf,i)] of the theoretical firms’ roles distributions, in correspondence 
of, differently aggregated, functional market segmentations. [I= level of aggregation]. 
I I II III IV V 
E(rf,i) 0.028599 3.629748 4.033372 1.479635 0 
 
 
 
Table 3. Expected asymptotic standard deviations E(σt,i) of the theoretical firms’ roles 
distributions, in correspondence of, differently aggregated, technological market segmentations. 
[I= level of aggregation]. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Expected asymptotic standard deviations E(σf,i) of the theoretical firms’ roles 
distributions, in correspondence of, differently aggregated, functional market segmentations. 
[I= level of aggregation]. 
 
 
 
I I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
E(rt,i) 2.301509 5.434899 8.76838 10.3647 12.22542 12.81956 13.22323 13.32692 
I I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
E(σt,i) 0.458557 1.521241 2.211816 2.117417 1.051688  0.51124 0.109549  0 
I I  II III IV V 
E(σf,i) 0.187135 0.595962 0.571586 0.155327 0 
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Table 5. E(rt,i)-2σt,i of the theoretical firms’ roles distributions in correspondence of, differently 
aggregated, technological market segmentations. [I= level of aggregation]. 
 
 
 
Table 6. E(rf,i)-2σf,I of the theoretical firms’ roles distributions in correspondence of, differently 
aggregated, functional market segmentations. [I= level of aggregation]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Observed firms’ roles distributions 
 
 
Table 7. Expected values E(Rt,i) of the empirically observed firms’ roles distributions, in 
correspondence of, differently aggregated, technological market segmentations. 
 [I= level of aggregation]. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Expected values E(Rf,i) of the empirically observed firms’ roles distributions, in 
correspondence of, differently aggregated, functional market segmentations. 
[I= level of aggregation]. 
 
I I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
E(rt,i)-2 σt,i   1.384395  2.392417 4.344748 6.129865 10.12205 11.79708 13.00414 13.32692 
I I  II  III  IV V  
E(rf,i)-2 σt,i   1.335214 1.57159314 1.9924752 3.54259795 3.9663866 
I I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
E(Rt,i) 1.185897 2.621795 4.096154 6.115385 9.679487 11.4359 12.90385 13.32692 
I I II III IV V 
E(Rf,i) 1.193277 2.386555 3.042017 3.546218 3.966387 
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